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After 1500 AD
by Frigga Kruse1
Abstract: This paper focuses on the commercial exploitation of Arctic 
mineral resources by European newcomers to the region. Minerals in demand 
were extracted in the North and transported to European markets for finan-
cial gain. This practice is bound up in the wider colonial history of the North 
and its discovery and utilisation by individuals, companies, and nation states 
intent on making profits and claiming territory. The general processes at work 
are illustrated using four case studies: Frobisher’s “black ore” from Baffin 
Island; the company-controlled extraction of Greenland cryolite; the “resource 
frontier frenzy” at Nome; and the race for coal in the no man’s land of Spits-
bergen. Such mineral-based processes set the scene for the emergence of the 
modern Arctic as a resource frontier region, which is currently seeing renewed 
interest from cooperations and nation states.
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel konzentriert sich auf die kommerzielle 
Ausbeutung von arktischen Bodenschätzen durch europäische Neuankömm-
linge in der Region. Auf Nachfrage wurden Minerale und Erze im Hohen 
Norden abgebaut und für finanzielle Bereicherung auf den europäischen 
Markt transportiert. Diese Praxis ist ein Teil der breiteren Kolonialgeschichte 
des Nordens und seiner Entdeckung und Nutzung durch Privatpersonen, 
Unternehmen oder Nationalstaaten, die beabsichtigten, Profit zu schlagen 
und neue Territorien zu beanspruchen. Die allgemeinen Prozesse, die hierbei 
vonstattengingen, werden anhand von vier Fallstudien dargestellt: Frobishers 
„schwarzes Erz“ von der Baffininsel; die durch ein Unternehmen gesteuerte 
Extraktion von grönländischem Kryolith; die „Ressourcengrenzgebietraserei“ 
in Nome; und der Wettlauf um Steinkohle im Niemandsland von Spitzbe-
rgen. Diese grundstoffbasierten Prozesse setzen die Entstehung der modernen 
Arktis als „Ressourcengrenzgebiet“ in Szene, welche derzeit erneut Interesse 
von Kooperationen und Nationalstatten auf sich zieht.
INTRODUCTION
Humans have been living in the Arctic for more than 
30,000 years (Pavel et al. 2001, PitulKo et al. 2004). For 
many millennia, their use of Arctic minerals and rocks was 
primarily for tool-making as an essential part of their subsis-
tence strategies, though some long-range exchange networks 
also emerged, leading to the movement of certain highly-
prized materials like chert. Though these resources no doubt 
had social and symbolic value, and could be exchanged and 
displayed, at no stage were these resources being extracted 
and transported for commercial profit, that is, to create wealth.
Therefore, the arrival of European explorers and traders into 
the margins of the Arctic world around 500 years ago marks a 
new phase in the human uses of Arctic mineral resources.
With little prior knowledge of the Arctic, the early Euro-
pean expeditions were driven by a range of factors. In fact, 
many were driven by motivations other than to mine Arctic 
minerals; the explorers wanted, for example, to discover new 
sea routes to the Orient, which would deliver lucrative trade 
opportunities. Their first encounters with – and reactions to 
– local mineral resources were therefore opportunistic and 
speculative, commonly leading to mistakes and false hopes. 
Over time, these relationships changed as knowledge of the 
Arctic grew and external demands for mineral resources 
increased from the sixteenth through to the twentieth century. 
This paper aims to give a broad-brush overview of the Euro-
pean commercial exploitation of Arctic mineral resources 
over the last five centuries. These provide an important histor-
ical context to modern debates about the Arctic as a “new” 
resource frontier, with exciting commercial opportunities 
opening up due to the melting sea ice and new seaways.
The historical overview plots substantial changes in commer-
cial exploitation of the Arctic. These transformations are 
illustrated by four case studies. Each has been chosen on the 
grounds of geographical spread (Fig. 1) as well as different 
historical contexts in order to illustrate similarities and differ-
ences through space and time.
1) Frobisher’s voyages to Arctic Canada in the late six-teenth 
century took place in an age of discovery and trade. Although 
unprofitable, his Meta Incognita (unknown shore) in south 
Baffin Island quickly acquired the tell-tale characteristics of a 
resource frontier region, albeit a short-lived one.
2) Against the backdrop of the Industrial Revolution, the 
130-year story of the Ivigtut cryolite mine in Greenland exem-
plifies the successful application of Arctic science to global 
technology. Since the mine’s closure, the company town has 
become a downward transitional area, whose venture into 
geo-tourism has not paid off.
3) Gold lay at the heart of what may be termed “resource fron-
tier frenzies” such as the rush to Nome, Alaska, at the turn of 
the twentieth century. Such frenzies appear to occur out of any 
context, but Nome had its roots in the Californian stampede 
of 1849. When the hype died down, chaos gave way to order 
as the former boomtown was incorporated; gold mining here 
continues to this day.
4) In the case of Spitsbergen in the European High Arctic, a no 
man’s land prior to 1925, the so-called “coal rush” provided 
rising nations with an impetus for colonial aspirations, poten-
tially upsetting the European balance of power. The length and 
persistence of coal extraction in the archipelago is an excep-
tion to the general pattern of Arctic mining.
____________ 
doi:10.2312/polarforschung.86.1.15
1  University of Groningen, Arctic Centre, Aweg 30, 9718CW Groningen, The Nether-
lands; <f.kruse@rug.nl>
Manuscript received 17 December 2014; accepted 12 September 2016.
16
These historical perspectives are important. The current atten-
tion on Arctic mineral resources and the realisation that many 
important lessons can be learned from the past calls for fresh 
approaches at the Arctic research frontier. The history of 
Arctic mining and its economic, political, and environmental 
consequences being a new and timely research direction and 
industrial archaeology being an innovative technique, there is 
much to be done.
CASE STUDIES
Case study 1:
The Frobisher expeditions to Baffin Island (1576, 1577, 1578)
Sir Martin Frobisher (1535?-1594) was an English privateer, 
explorer, and naval commander, who undertook three voyages 
to the Canadian Arctic in 1576, 1577, and 1578 (Holland 
1994, McderMott 2004a). Early Modern Europe had reared 
its head with Columbus’ arrival in the New World in 1492, and 
the subsequent era of discovery witnessed the Western Euro-
pean search for new trading routes. Portugal and Spain led the 
way; Russia conquered the whole of Siberia, while France, 
England, and the Netherlands sought to imitate the Iberian 
accomplishments. To avoid conflict in the widespread Portu-
guese and Spanish colonies, a commercial sea route north of 
the Americas was considered for the first time, and the Italian 
John Cabot (under English commission) initiated the search 
for this elusive passage to Cathay (China) in 1497. Only 
between 1903 and 1906 did the Norwegian Roald Amundsen 
successfully navigate the Northwest Passage, and a single-
season transit was not achieved until 1944.
Martin Frobisher was typical of this period. He met with the 
London mercer, merchant adventurer, and traveller Michael 
Lok (ca. 1532-1622) in 1574, and together they organised an 
expedition with the primary objective to unveil said north-west 
passage to the Orient (McderMott 2004b). In June 1576, two 
small barks and a pinnace, carrying a total of 34 men, left the 
Thames. After a storm, only one bark was able to continue 
the journey, which brought Frobisher to Meta Incognita in 
the south of Baffin Island. This expedition is remembered 
for sighting the southern tip of Greenland, the discovery of 
Frobisher Bay, making contact with the Inuit (eHrenstein 
1998), and the formal attempt to claim the newly discovered 
territory for Queen Elizabeth I.
Central to this paper, however, is a small piece of rock, which 
Frobisher’s men collected on Little Hall Island at the mouth of 
Frobisher Bay (62°31’ N, 64°10’ W). Commonly referred to as 
“black ore”, the enthusiastic Lok had this rock assayed until 
someone confirmed the presence of gold in it (donald 1950, 
HogartH & looP 1986, McderMott 2004a). This alleged 
discovery of gold quickly attracted support for the follow-up 
expeditions in 1577 and 1578. In 1577, the unpromising Little 
Hall Island was quickly dismissed in favour of Countess of 
Warwick’s Island, now Kodlunarn Island (62°49’ N, 65°25’ 
W), where about 160 tons of ore were mined. Back in England, 
the assays were inconclusive. Nonetheless, the momentous 
wave created by the prospect of gold swept another 15 ships, 
conveying about 400 men, to Kodlunarn Island and surrounds 
in 1578, where circa 1370 tons of ore disappeared into their 
hulls. Once again, the assays found nothing of value. By now, 
confidence in the enterprise had waned. Despite £ 25,000 of 
investments (ca. £ 4 million in today’s money) being irretriev-
Fig. 1: The Arctic Ocean basemap indicates the 
locations of the four case studies of Kodlunarn Island, 
Ivigtut, Nome, and Spitsbergen, which were chosen 
on the grounds of geographical and temporal spread. 
Sources: Esri, GEBCO, NOAA, National Geographic, 
DeLorme, HERE, Geonames.org, and others; adapted 
by the author.
Abb. 1: Die Basiskarte des Arktischen Ozeans zeigt 
die Lage der vier Fallstudien Kodlunarn Island, Ivigtut, 
Nome und Spitzbergen, die aufgrund der geografischen 
und zeitlichen Verbreitung ausgewählt wurden. Quellen: 
Esri, GEBCO, NOAA, National Geographic, DeLorme, 
HERE, Geonames.org u.a.; vom Autor angepasst.
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ably lost, McderMott (2004a) emphasizes that the enter-
prise was not a spectacular failure; rather it disintegrated as 
its backers dissociated themselves from it, leaving Lok bank-
rupted and Frobisher disgraced until he regained royal favour 
in the West Indies raid of 1585.
Frobisher’s unprofitable mines lay forgotten for almost three 
centuries. Their modern story begins with Charles Francis 
Hall’s Inuit-inspired visit to Kodlunarn Island in 1861. In 
1964, a re-evaluation of Frobisher’s achievements and lega-
cies led to the island being formally recognised as a National 
Historic Site of Canada. The canadian register (2009) 
states that, “the heritage value […] lies in its association with 
the mining attempts of Martin Frobisher as illustrated by the 
site and the archaeological evidence it retains to confirm 
Frobisher’s 16th-century presence and activities. Evidence also 
survives in the oral traditions of the Inuit people who have 
preserved an account of this first European attempt to exploit 
the natural resources of the Arctic.”
Yet, said archaeological evidence was not entirely appreciated 
until the international and interdisciplinary Meta Incognita 
Project could address this shortcoming in the 1990s (syMons 
1999a). Some readers may wonder what archaeological inves-
tigation can add to an historical event that was reasonably well 
documented in its time. To begin with, the European material 
culture is undeniable proof that Frobisher’s Arctic expeditions 
had, in fact, taken place; the material remains thus verify the 
documentary record. Besides, the material remains encoun-
tered, subject to four centuries of physical erosion and human 
disturbance, were better preserved than the documents would 
have believe. The project’s aims, therefore, were to protect 
this non-renewable resource and to qualify the historical envi-
ronment, thereby aiding conservation, research, and commu-
nication.
The Meta Incognita Project gave rise to a number of commend-
able publications (alsford 1993, fitzHugH & olin 1993, 
HogartH et al. 1994, syMons 1999b), but a brief summary 
of the archaeology of Kodlunarn Island and surrounds must 
suffice here. The small, mostly barren rock situated 500 m off 
the northeast shore of Frobisher Bay formed the principal base 
of Frobisher’s mining activities. The archaeological fieldwork 
in the early 1990s entailed mostly non-intrusive methods in 
addition to very limited excavation.
The main features were two mining trenches, an area of 
former industrial activity, and the foundations of the so-called 
Frobisher House. The Ship’s Trench, thought to be the first 
European mine in North America, was cut into the island’s 
northern coast. Although Inuit oral traditions hint at ship 
building or repair, rock thought to be a mineral ore had 
probably been exposed at this location, and a vein had been 
followed in a south-easterly direction, resulting in a trough 
measuring 25 by 5 m. In 1578, unused supplies were buried in 
it, some of which were recovered in a small excavation. The 
Reservoir Trench (Fig. 2), its name suggesting the unlikely 
function of a freshwater store, lay 100 m to the southeast yet 
in line with the Ship’s Trench, supporting the notion of a vein 
being targeted and exploited. This trench had similar dimen-
sions, being only one to two meters deep. Both trenches were 
therefore very shallow surface workings. Tool marks indicated 
that the extraction of extremely hard rock was accomplished 
by pick-and-hammer method; an inventory of mining tools 
taken by Frobisher showed that plug-and-feather techniques 
were intended, too. Aforementioned industrial area comprised 
flat, sloping ground between the Reservoir Trench and the 
east coast of the island. Over an 80 m spread, coal, slag, and 
fragments of charcoal and industrial ceramics were found and 
interpreted as the remains of activities associated with mining 
such as tool repair and smelting ore for assay. It is uncertain 
if this area included any buildings; closer comparison with 
historical sources may yet resolve this. The Frobisher House, 
formerly Fenton’s Watchtower, once stood on a 37 m hill, the 
highest point of the island. Its remains consisted of a shallow 
irregular pit and a scatter of large boulders. Its foundation 
was relatively well preserved, showing some roughly-hewn 
stones and the use of lime mortar. The house being neither 
very big nor high, documentary sources completed the picture 
of stone-and-wood walls with a wooden roof. Lesser archae-
ological features were a pair of standing stones that could be 
grave markers and two large areas of scattered stones, expla-
nations of which range from former cairns protecting buried 
supplies to the remnants of Inuit tent rings. In addition to the 
Fig. 2: The inconspicuous Reservoir Trench on 
Kodlunarn Island in Frobisher Bay has attained 
Canadian cultural heritage status as part of the 
earliest European mine in North America and the 
Arctic. © William Fitzhugh, Arctic Studies Centre, 
Smithsonian Institute.
Abb. 2: Der unscheinbare „Reservoir Trench“ auf 
Kodlunarn Island in der Frobisherbucht erreichte 
als Teil der ersten europäischen Mine in Nordame-
rika und der Arktis den Status eines kanadischen 
Kulturerbes. © William Fitzhugh, Arctic Studies 
Centre, Smithsonian Institute.
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material culture on Kodlunarn Island, an off-island survey 
revealed an impressive 75 sites also thought to be associated 
with Frobisher. In a timely move away from simply focussing 
on specific mining sites, an entire archaeological landscape of 
Arctic mineral exploration was thus revealed and tentatively 
addresses the question of what distinguishes prospecting and 
outright mining. What fills the gap between no activity at all 
and mineral extraction? When does a test pit become a small 
mine?
Frobisher’s Arctic material legacy not being enough, it 
deserves mention that the “black ore” was destined for Dart-
ford in England, where prototype smelting works had been 
purpose-built along the River Darent (dartford town 
arcHive 2014). The ore being worthless, it was subsequently 
used in construction: some of it can still be viewed in the 
western wall around Henry VIII’s Manor House in Dartford. 
Nonetheless, the establishment of unique smelting works 
directly led to a long tradition of specialised industry along the 
Darent. One wonders if in this way, any dire environmental 
consequences that often overshadow Arctic mineral extraction 
were unwittingly diverted to the home country.
Geologically speaking, this abridged account of Frobisher’s 
expeditions raises a number of issues and leads to new ques-
tions. In the first instance, “geology” was simply something 
that was in the way; Frobisher, after all, was looking for a 
convenient sea passage, not impeding landmasses. He most 
certainly had no prior geological training besides the notion 
that precious metals could be found in the ground. In this 
regard, castells (2009) highlights the significance of Frobi-
sher’s alleged gold from the Arctic, where it was not thought 
to exist, as a bone of contention between natural philosophy 
and the emerging scientific process. It serves as an instructive 
example in a bygone age when new knowledge challenged 
the traditional doctrines of science. While Frobisher’s men 
were probably inexperienced miners, their efforts nonetheless 
contributed directly to the progress of smelting technology, 
while the overly optimistic assays have been blamed on the 
failings of contemporary metallurgy and the doubtful compe-
tence of the assayers rather than intentional fraud (HogartH 
& looP 1986, castells 2009). Historical searches for gold, 
however, should not be dismissed too easily: the search 
continues with, for instance, coMMander resources ltd 
(2006) and the Baffin Island Gold Project.
What else does the claim of Frobisher’s being the first Euro-
pean mines in North America and the Arctic entail? In the 
context of this paper, Meta Incognita may be viewed as the 
archetypal resource frontier region: it ticks all the boxes 
(friedeMann 1966, sugden 1982). The notion of a devel-
oping Arctic resource frontier region quickly puts Frobish-
er’s voyages into a new light. As syMons (1999a) proposes, 
they prophesied “the future synergy of maritime navigation, 
expanding intellectual horizons, colonial ambitions, and 
industrial enterprise.”
Since the Frobisher expeditions, the Arctic could be seen as 
a region of opportunity and with the hope of striking it rich. 
These motivations remained in place over the following 
centuries, but they were expressed in different ways and had 
different outcomes.
Case study 2:
The cryolite mine at Ivigtut, Greenland (1854-1987)
Between the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth 
century, the Industrial Revolution brought about rapid and 
drastic changes in European agriculture, manufacture, and 
transport, which had lasting socioeconomic and cultural 
effects. Against the backdrop of this process, which continued 
as industrialisation, the scientific discoveries and commercial 
products of the cryolite mine at Ivigtut (presently Ivittuut, 
61°12’ N, 48°10’ W) in Arsuk Fjord in southwestern Green-
land directly led to technological improvements on a global 
scale, despite both mine and company town now being aban-
doned.
The prologue of Greenland’s European history had quite liter-
ally been carved in stone by Norse settlers between the late 
tenth century and the mid-fifteenth century; in fact, Ivigtut lies 
within the so-called Middle Settlement comprising 41 known 
archaeological sites (edwards et al. 2013). Following their 
demise and subsequent absence, Frobisher sighted Greenland 
again in 1576, and several expeditions followed suit until 
the noteworthy arrival of the Dano-Norwegian clergyman 
Hans Egede in 1721. As part of the Danish colonisation of 
the Americas, Egede and other colonists were under royal 
orders to search for exploitable natural resources of any kind 
(secHer 2003, governMent of greenland 2014). At the 
time, whaling formed the staple European activity, and from 
1776, the state-owned Royal Greenland Trading Company 
(Dan. Den Kongelige Grønlandske Handel, KGH) monopo-
lised all trade (strøM tejsen 1977, KragH 1995). Although 
Egede had reported the occurrence of graphite and the KGH 
occasionally brought curiosity minerals back to Denmark, 
systematic exploration and mining were not initiated until the 
mid-1800s (secHer 2003), from when on Holland (1994) 
registers regular Danish geological expeditions to Greenland.
Mining had already arrived in Greenland in the form of 
German coal extraction in Disko Bay (1780), when the 
mineral cryolite first caught the attention of Europeans. The 
year of “discovery” is commonly cited as 1799, although 
some discrepancies exist (KragH 1995, ralPH & cHau 
2014a). Besides, the mineral was not at all new to the Green-
landers, who are said to have used it as fishing weights, for 
example (elBo 1948, KragH 1995). Nonetheless, the colour-
less to white mineral, which may occasionally appear reddish, 
brownish, or even black and usually occurs in massive 
coarsely granular rock, was not fully analysed until 1823, and 
even then, the small amounts shipped from an undisclosed 
locality made it seem rare and without immediate industrial 
use (KragH 1995). Thus, cryolite had to wait its turn until its 
industrial use in chemical manufacture was investigated in 
1847, and by 1849, the Danish chemist Julius Thomsen (1826-
1909) had produced small amounts of sodium carbonate or 
soda in the lab. At the time, the limited domestic production 
of soda from kelp could not meet the growing demand of local 
soap and glass manufacturers. If cryolite proved a suitable 
raw material, Thomsen would be able to intercept the import 
of foreign soda and exploit the market niche. The deposit 
at Ivigtut, which occurred as a pegmatitic body in a granite 
stock intruded into gneiss (ralPH & cHau 2014b), had been 
shown to be fairly large and accessible by sea, when Thomsen 
was granted the patent to manufacture cryolite soda in 1853. 
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Organised extraction in Greenland was as of yet lacking, and 
Thomsen depended on the monopoly-bearing KGH, who only 
shipped 90 tons of the raw material between 1854 and 1856. 
This bottleneck, however, was overcome when Thomsen and 
his business partners obtained the right to extract cryolite 
themselves.
By now, cryolite knew two uses: while Thomsen wanted to 
make soda, a dominant partner was primarily interested in 
the production of aluminium, then an expensive metal with 
great future potential (KragH 1995). Trial shipments were 
therefore sent to France, and in 1856, French representatives 
visited Ivigtut. One disillusioned mineralogist reported that 
“conditions for extraction and shipping were unsatisfactory. 
The ice fields, the hard climate, the lack of organization of 
the extraction, and the limited amount of cryolite above water 
level – all this made him conclude that cryolite would remain 
a costly mineral unsuited for industry at a larger scale.” 
(KragH 1995, 294). By 1858, it was indeed clear that cryolite 
aluminium would not be a money-spinner, and ca. 1,500 kg 
produced in 1859 were so dear that they could barely find a 
market. The French works were closed in 1864.
Meanwhile, the modest production of cryolite soda had begun 
in Southern Jutland, from where it was moved to the Kryo-
lithfabriken Øresund in Copenhagen in 1859. That year, 
“Øresund” consumed 1,500 tons of cryolite to make roughly 
2,200 tons of soda. After some economic difficulties, an inde-
pendent firm was formed in 1865 to handle extraction and sale 
while Øresund took care of processing and soda production. 
In addition, an important contract was signed with the Penn-
sylvania Salt Manufacturing Company of Philadelphia (Penn-
salt) for 6,000 tons of cryolite per year, after which Pennsalt 
monopolised the Americas. The 1860s were good years with 
several cooperating European firms and a substantial output: 
for the period between 1865 and 1869, KragH (1995) esti-
mates an average of 14,000 tons of soda per year compared 
with Germany’s 6,000 tons and France’s 45,000 tons. During 
the 1870s, however, the quality of cryolite decreased and the 
price of soda was down. By 1884, the European works had 
stopped production, and Øresund focused on other cryolite 
products such as enamels, aluminium, and fluorspar. In 1894, 
soda production ceased in Copenhagen, Pennsalt following 
suit in 1900.
Despite the end of the original main product – cryolite soda 
– the economic importance of cryolite increased dramati-
cally with the invention of the Hall-Héroult process in 1886 
(KragH 1995). Between 1887 and 1987, cryolite from Ivigtut 
(Fig. 3) would be used as a flux in the production of metallic 
aluminium, becoming indispensable to modern industry 
(secHer 2002, governMent of greenland 2014). This 
importance undeniably found expression during World War 
II. Once Germany had occupied Denmark in April 1940 and 
the Denmark-Greenland connection was severed until May 
1945, the resident Greenland Administration took over the 
mine and exported cryolite partly to Pennsalt, partly to Canada 
(elBo 1948). The US soon built a naval base in Arsuk Fjord 
to prevent a German takeover (rasMussen 2005). As of 1941, 
regular US Army units were stationed at Ivigtut’s twin town 
Grønnedal (presently Kangilinnguit), the only Greenlandic 
settlements to be connected by road. The soldiers were not 
allowed inside the mine, however, where the miners them-
selves took care of security. elBo (1948) states that the very 
high cryolite production during the conflict was partly due to 
the US storing large amounts in case Ivigtut should be cut off 
from America.
The English geologist Elbo visited the site after the war 
and provided an image of over 80 buildings – shacks, store-
houses, barracks, machine-shops, a hospital – clustered around 
the open-pit mine, which lay about 60 m from the shore (elBo 
1948). The mine was about 190 m long, between 45 and 100 
metres wide, and roughly 60 metres deep. The machinery 
was up-to-date, the granitic rock being air-blasted in winter 
and the cryolite shot down in summer. Excavators loaded the 
mineral into waggons, which were transported by elevator to 
be loaded directly into the ships. The granite was further used 
to enlarge the quay while a reinforced concrete dam would 
allow extraction closer to the water. The summer workforce of 
around 175 men shrank to 120 in winter. Prior to 1945, mainly 
Danes and some Norwegians had been employed; recently, 
there were supposedly also Greenlanders for general duties. 
Their living quarters were comfortable with many amenities. 
The company town also comprised a wireless station, a tele-
phone exchange, and two fire stations.
During the war, synthetic cryolite had increasingly been used, 
lowering the market price of the naturally-occurring mineral 
Fig. 3: In 1898, the Ivigtut cryolite mine was a 
hub of activity due to its global importance in the 
production of metallic aluminium. © The IMM 
Archive.
Abb. 3: Im Jahre 1898 war Ivigtuts Kryolithmine 
ein Zentrum der Aktivität aufgrund seiner 
globalen Bedeutung bei der Herstellung von 
metallischem Aluminium. © Das IMM Archiv.
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(rasMussen 2005). Coupled with the diminishing quality 
of the deposit, mining at Ivigtut was halted in 1962 (KragH 
1995). Cryolite production continued for a while yet with 
former dumps being dug out, the low-grade mineral being 
extracted, and the pier made of waste rock being removed 
(rasMussen 2005, ralPH & cHau 2014b). In 1987, all activi-
ties were terminated, and the Greenland Home Rule authorities 
obtained the facilities. The Ivigtut Cryolite Mine had produced 
approximately 3.7 million tons with an average content of 
58 % (secHer 2002). It was claimed to have been very prof-
itable and to have brought significant socioeconomic benefits 
to the region (elBo 1948, strøM tejsen 1977, governMent 
of greenland 2014). Nonetheless, it had a 130-year history 
of being a resource frontier region: after mine closure, what 
could Ivigtut, now Ivittuut, do to keep from becoming a down-
ward transitional area?!
Downward transition of a former resource frontier region is 
characterised by low productivity, declining resources, low 
living standards, high out-migration, and social demoralisation 
among others (sugden 1982). To prevent this from happening, 
a region must achieve increased autonomy and self-reliant 
economic growth in good time. After the mine closure in 
1987, Ivittuut essentially survived as a side effect of Island 
Command Greenland being based at Grønnedal (Kangilinn-
guit). As of 2003, the town sought diversification and alterna-
tive income in opening the Ivittuut Mine and Mineral Museum 
(IMM 2014). (Dan. Ivituut Mine- og Mineralmuseum). Its 
extensive website, in Danish and Kalaallisut, offered a glimpse 
into its professional and informative exhibits and gave an 
impression of the experiences that awaited the visitor on a tour 
around the former mine and company town. The commendable 
venture into geotourism was supported by EuroGeoSurveys, 
a non-profit organisation that represents 33 National Geolog-
ical Surveys in Europe, which recognises that “geological 
heritage provides added economic growth value to tourism” 
(eurogeosurveys 2014). Furthermore, “mining heritage 
represents a record of part of our cultural and technological 
history. This will allow present and future generations to learn 
from personal experience how much mining owes to human 
commitment and endeavour.” (eurogeosurveys 2014) This 
rings particularly true for the Arctic. However, when Island 
Command Greenland was reorganised into Arctic Command 
in 2012 and its headquarters were moved to the Greenlandic 
capital of Nuuk, the local municipality closed the twin towns 
of Ivittuut and Kangilinnguit, depriving them of all commu-
nity services. Consequently, the Ivittuut Museum abruptly 
had to shut its doors and relocate away from the site. It had 
not yet generated much revenue, but this was due to a lack 
of infrastructure rather than a lack of interest; “in fact, the 
interest from cruise ships is enormous” (Secher pers. com. 
2014) Thus, diversification came too late to stop the down-
ward spiral, and governmental policy made matters worse. 
So what is to happen to the ghost town? According to Green-
landic regulations, it should be cleaned up and brought back 
to its natural state [author’s italics]. Unsurprisingly, there is 
a growing concern among cultural heritage specialists that the 
unique historical fingerprint of the Ivigtut cryolite mine will 
be irreversibly destroyed.
While Frobisher’s was an ill-informed, small-scale adventure 
that ended in failure, this case study has shown that Arctic 
mines, despite location and climate, can be long-term and prof-
itable. Ivigtut benefitted from scientific breakthroughs rekin-
dling demand in time for a new lease on life. Still, it could not 
be spared the fate that awaits many mines and mining commu-
nities worldwide.
Case study 3: 
The gold rush in Nome, Alaska (1898-1901)
Gold lay at the heart of what may be termed resource frontier 
frenzies such as the celebrated stampede at Klondike, Yukon, 
and the less well-known rush to Nome, Alaska, at the turn of 
the twentieth century. Such resource frontier frenzies appear 
to occur suddenly and out of any context, but they have their 
roots in the Californian gold rush of 1849. When the media-fu-
elled hype died down and the chaos was quenched, a town was 
established. Having instigated Alaska’s evolution from unpop-
ular purchase (“Seward’s Folly”) to statehood, gold and other 
mineral resources continue to be mined in Nome (64°29’ N, 
165°24’ W) today.
The human fascination in gold reaches far back: the earliest 
and largest amount of gold artefacts in the world has been 
found at the Varna Chalcolithic Necropolis in Bulgaria, 
dating from the middle of the fifth millennium BC (Kostov 
2010). Native American Indians, on the other hand, had little 
interest in the precious metal, and European discoveries in 
the United States were only made as recently as 1799. Within 
half a century, between 1849 and 1851, the archetypal Cali-
fornian gold rush occurred. California forms the point of 
departure for subsequent resource frontier frenzies, and the 
concept of adventurism as a type of risk behaviour and social 
action provides an insight into who actually took part and 
why. HaMilton (1978, 1467) defines adventurism as “the 
act of taking great risks whose outcomes are not calculable 
in advance [as well as] actions undertaken for sizable social, 
political, and economic gains that might occur if the venture 
is successful.” It applies to the Arctic, too, that adventurism 
was a temporary mobility strategy to substantially alter one’s 
social standing in the home country. Although unpredictable, 
mining – especially the search for gold – offered the fastest 
way to wealth and social status. It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that following the Californian stampede, Holland (1994) 
records an increasing number of geological expeditions into 
the Yukon and Alaska. In 1741, Russian sailors had been the 
first Europeans to land on Alaskan shores, and Russian gold-
prospecting expeditions were conducted here in 1849-51 and 
in 1852. Significantly, a member of the Western Union Tele-
graph Expedition found gold on the Seward Peninsula in 1866 
(carlson 1946). Yet, the US purchase of Alaska (1867), the 
first Alaskan gold rush in the Juneau Mining District (1881), 
and the Klondike gold rush (1897-9) had to pass, before 
Daniel B. Libby decided to act on his find. The gold discovery 
in Anvil Creek on the southern shores of the peninsula on 
August 5, 1898 was not the result of a sudden lucky strike; 
rather it was the outcome of four separate and gruelling pros-
pecting trips partly aided by natives.
At the time of the decisive discovery, Alaska was not a legal 
US territory; it was a district with a governor and other offi-
cers but without legislature. Thus, it was entirely dependent on 
US Congress for all legislation (McKee 1902). In September 
1898, the original discoverers began staking claims in Anvil 
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Creek. Realising they had made a mistake according to US 
mining laws, they quickly restaked the claims as part of their 
founding the Cape Nome Mining District, an area of 625 
square miles (carlson 1946). In the mining district, local 
laws now governed the size of placer claims, the staking of 
claims by power of attorney, the time in which a claim needed 
to be recorded, and the use of water, the latter for practical 
mining reasons as opposed to environmental concern for the 
natural water courses. A district recorder was elected for a 
period of two years, and the fee for recording was set at two 
dollars and fifty cents. Work now began in earnest, and the 
first riches were retrieved. By November, however, all avail-
able water had frozen, and the mining season had effectively 
ended. Returning to the Swedish mission in nearby Golovin 
Bay, the discoverers could not keep the news of the rich strike 
to themselves: in the usual wildfire fashion, word spread, and 
before the year was over, the rush on Nome had begun.
Of interest to this paper is how the discovery of an Arctic 
mineral resource such as gold increases anthropogenic pres-
sure on the land and leads to territorial claiming, settlement, 
law and order, and ultimately government. In December 1898, 
the first month of the stampede, about 300 claims had been 
staked and recorded, while more had been located (carlson 
1946). The right to claim by power of attorney was stretched 
beyond all reason, and although the local law required that 
minerals be found before a claim was made, men acted on the 
notion that any ground could contain gold and gobbled up the 
territory. By May 1899, claims had been made as far as 40 
miles west of Nome. When the Cape Nome Mining District 
was fully staked in July, other mining districts were founded. 
A white city of tents (Fig. 4) that expanded for several miles 
on both sides of the Snake River bore witness to the phenom-
enal growth of the settlement (carlson 1947a). Due to a 
lack of building materials on the tundra, the construction of 
houses was difficult. Any buildings initially belonged to the 
mercantile companies. In early July, a town-site committee 
was set up in an attempt to bring order into the chaos of claim-
jumping and town-plot-jumping. A few days later, disgruntled 
miners challenged the organisation of the Cape Nome Mining 
District, and while a small military detachment could disband 
the conspiracy, the situation remained critical. It was never 
officially resolved because on July 11, 1899, the unexpected 
discovery of gold in the beach sands and the ease with which 
it could be extracted sufficiently evened the odds (carlson 
1947a). The stampede to the beach sands was rapid, massive, 
and temporary. Although the steady mining on the creeks, 
of which Anvil and Glacier creeks were the richest, was far 
more productive, big employers like the Pioneer Mining Co. 
lost many workers to the beaches in August and September. 
By December 1899, roughly 4500 claims, unevenly divided 
into tundra claims, beach claims, quartz and lode claims, and 
placer claims, had produced an output of some $ 2.5 million 
(carlson 1946).
After its first season, the settlement had gained some stability. 
The mining camp was underway to becoming a civilised fron-
tier town. carlson (1947b) has identified several factors 
that contributed to this development. Firstly, the discovery of 
gold in the beaches calmed a charged situation, and despite 
on-going claim-jumping, the military was able to keep violent 
outbreaks at bay. Federal justice was implemented in Alaska, 
and on his epic 5000 mile circuit through the district, Judge 
Johnson validated claims made by power of attorney while 
leaving the question of claims held by so-called aliens to 
the US Government. In addition, a consent government 
was elected in Nome, although it had no legal incorpora-
tion and lacked the power to raise taxes. Religious services 
commenced, and newly established newspapers mellowed the 
expression of conflicting opinions. Poor living conditions and 
the lack of fresh water were tackled by issuing health ordi-
nances and plans for draining and sewage disposal. In many 
ways, Nome was a typical boomtown in a resource frontier 
region, but would it be sustainable once mining was no longer 
an option?
In 1901, Nome was incorporated. US law encouraged 
migrants to settle in such towns, and once population and 
development warranted, the frontier would gain full state-
hood. Alaskan statehood was granted in 1959. Nicknamed 
Fig. 4: A white city of tents mushroomed during 
the gold rush in the Cape Nome Mining district 
in Alaska. Source: Alaska State Library, William 
E. Hunt Photo Collection, P155-1-27; reproduced 
with permission.
Abb. 4: Während des Goldrausches im Cape No-
me Bergbaubezirk wuchsen weiße Zelte wie Pilze 
aus dem Boden. Quelle: Alaska State Library, 
William E. Hunt Photo Collection, P155-1-27; 
Druck mit Erlaubnis.
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“the Last Frontier”, mining for gold and other economic 
minerals is on-going. Regarding “Nome’s new gold rush” 
(alasKa disPatcH news 2012), the State’s Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR 2014) recently reported, “With the 
current high price of gold and increased interest in offshore 
mining, there have been several incidents of friction between 
the miners of the East Nome Beach Public Mining Area. Local 
police have been called on three occasions.” The DNR has 
since proposed stipulations to manage the Nome Beach Recre-
ational Mining Areas. It hopes that permits for recreational 
gold mining will adequately enforce civilised conduct.
The biggest losers during the Nome gold rush were probably 
the Alaskan natives as pressure on their land increased, game 
animals landed in miners’ cooking pots, fishing streams were 
destroyed, and disease and drinking spread. This aside, the 
progression from the discovery of gold to the establishment of 
a stable Arctic community was seemingly a linear one. It took 
place despite negligible American governmental presence 
at the northern frontier. Compared to, for instance, the strict 
laws in Northern Canada, “[t]he American version stressed 
local autonomy and the right of settlers to establish their own 
system of government and frame their own regulations. In the 
territories of the United States, federal government authority 
was asserted differently and was likely to the challenged 
… [F]ew regulations were imposed from outside to check 
the triumphs of the most efficient producers of the speedy 
reorganisation of industry to maximise profits.” (zaslow 1971 
in coates 1978). At least there was a federal government, 
unlike in other Arctic regions.
The mining history of Nome highlights the need for law and 
order at the mining frontier and illustrates the role of natural 
resources and mineral wealth in the establishment of federal 
government and statehood. At the same time, Spitsbergen in 
the European Arctic was one of the world’s last no man’s lands 
coveted by many rising nations. Its case demonstrates Arctic 
mineral resource development and settlement long unchecked 
by any regulations.
Case study 4:
The “coal rush” on Spitsbergen (1899-1927)
In 1596, the first documentation of Spitsbergen (presently 
Svalbard, 78°13’ N, 15°39’ E) by the Dutch navigator Willem 
Barents set in motion its transformation from a pristine wilder-
ness into a considerably impacted resource frontier region. 
The uninhabited archipelago in the European High Arctic was 
attractive for two reasons: it comprised an unknown quantity 
of natural resources, and it was a terra incognita (unknown 
land) unoccupied, ungoverned – and therefore unrestricted – 
by any nation state. Seafaring nations soon hunted walruses 
and whales followed by phases of trapping, scientific expe-
ditions, tourism, and mining. It is therefore short-sighted to 
say that Spitsbergen is still a pristine wilderness today. What 
makes it so fascinating to study is that the archipelago was one 
of the last remaining no man’s lands and that both archaeolog-
ical and historical sources survive with which to reconstruct 
not only the exploitation of its natural resources but also the 
emergence of peripheral Arctic Spitsbergen on the world’s 
political stage.
Mineral resources, of which coal was the most pertinent, 
played a key role in the latter process. Although coal seams 
had been reported by an Englishman in 1610, a Norwegian 
sailing captain sent a first commercial shipment to Norway, a 
country lacking native coal reserves, in 1899. At the time, the 
nation states of Europe clung to a precarious balance of power 
whilst cultivating their armed forces and alliances; irrespective 
of minor skirmishes among the globe-embracing empires that 
heralded a major conflict, an initial wave of entrepreneurial 
excitement saw the establishment of Norwegian, British, and 
American companies on Spitsbergen. These were followed 
by Swedish, Russian, and Dutch firms. The scale of this “coal 
rush”, however, did not come close to the aforementioned gold 
rushes: Hoel (1966a, 1966b, 1967) describes the involve-
ment of about twenty small companies. Thorough historical 
research could probably reveal the names of many if not all of 
the men, who came in their hundreds, not thousands. Since the 
individual extraction of a bulk commodity like coal is highly 
impractical, most miners reached the islands “by invitation 
only”, that is to say, they were contracted in countries like 
Britain, Norway, or Sweden and transported into the Arctic 
aboard a company vessel. Nonetheless, the “coal rush” gener-
ated a flurry of activity never before witnessed on Spitsbergen, 
and soon, prospecting camps and company towns sprung up in 
the different bays.
Although some partnerships were formed, companies of any 
nationality were by and large guilty of wholesale claiming 
and reckless claim-jumping. The increasing number of claim 
disputes, with their potential for international violence, were 
brought to the attention of the governments concerned. They 
were undoubtedly a factor in the simultaneously erupting 
conflict over the sovereignty of the archipelago. Temporarily 
put on hold by World War I, the so-called Spitsbergen Ques-
tion was dealt with during the Paris Peace Conference, the 
resultant Spitsbergen Treaty being signed in 1920. It decided 
sovereignty in favour of Norway, but it made allowances for 
the multi-national character of the developing mining industry. 
The name of Svalbard was adopted at the treaty’s ratification 
in 1925. The “coal rush”, however, was only over in 1927, 
when the independent Danish Commission finally settled all 
claim disputes.
Addressing Spitsbergen’s unsettled legal status and the multi-
national character of its mining industry, recent interdisci-
plinary research has concentrated on the mining history and 
industrial archaeology of the Swedish, American, and British 
enterprises (avango 2005, dePasqual 2009, Hartnell 2009, 
Kruse 2013). A publication on the Dutch venture is forth-
coming. Focusing on the British example, four companies 
were shown to have been active on the archipelago (Kruse 
2013). In addition, two fraudulent companies, one company 
under Russian management, and another firm formed after 
World War II were outside the scope of that study, while a 
last one founded to underwrite shares only received tangential 
mention.
In essence, there was no British model of exploitation and 
occupation for Spitsbergen (Kruse 2013). The Spitzbergen 
Coal & Trading Co. (1904-18) was a private coal mining 
company motivated by distinctly economic goals. It had no 
political interests besides securing its claim beyond all doubt 
and would have been satisfied with a Norwegian takeover of 
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the island group on the condition of reasonable mining laws 
and taxes. Overspending and incompetence were mainly to 
blame for its termination, although the directors listed diffi-
culties with the Scandinavian workers and the great distance 
from Sheffield as reasons for wanting to sell. The commercial 
objectives of the private Spitzbergen Mining & Exploration 
Syndicate (1906-11) were divided between mining coal and 
prospecting for gold. From the start, its directors were discon-
nected, it lacked in-house expertise, and there was a discord 
between shareholders preferring one resource over the other. 
Under the circumstances, the syndicate failed to implement a 
functional operational strategy and could not deliver the prod-
ucts its stakeholders were expecting. Internal strive was the 
most likely cause for the syndicate being unceremoniously 
crossed off the company register. This disappearance bene-
fitted the Northern Exploration Co. (NEC, 1910-1934), who 
without much ado took over the claims. It must be stressed 
that the NEC was a private exploration company aiming at 
the discovery of economic minerals and the involvement 
of subsidiary mining companies to extract them. It had not 
achieved this by the outbreak of World War I and was practi-
cally bankrupt.
War, however, reshuffled the cards, and the NEC, having 
gone public, used the politically-charged rhetoric of Arctic 
annexation being essential to British post-war reconstruction 
to win support for its Spitsbergen venture (Fig. 5). Despite 
its large capital, it lacked the necessary mining expertise; 
funds were spent generously on claims, assets, and transport 
before economic minerals could be proven. Having reached 
its exploratory limits, the company’s conversion to active 
mining in order to recover some of the original outlay came 
too late. Large debts forced it to sell to the Norwegian Govern-
ment. Similarly, the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate (SSS, 
1909-1953) started out as a private exploration company, had 
nothing to show for itself at the outbreak of war, and became 
a public company when the conflict had ended. Although the 
SSS did engage in company propaganda and financial busi-
ness, it did not go to the same extremes as the NEC. Instead, it 
prospected according to the professional standards of the time 
and provided the products expected of a respectable explora-
tion company. Remaining debt-free assured its longevity, but it 
also failed to attract subsidiary mining companies. The Scots 
put this down to several factors: the status of Spitsbergen was 
undecided; the British had long been accused of land-grabbing 
Fig. 5: Produced by the Northern Exploration Company in the closing stages of the First World War, this world map indicates the firm’s ambitious political goal of 
integrating Spitsbergen into the global British Empire, which would stabilise the emerging Arctic mining industry as well as increase the firm’s importance in the 
region. Source: Coal and iron in Spitsbergen (1918) Pam (*32): 622.333, Scott Polar Research Institute Library, Cambridge.
Abb. 5: Produziert von der Northern Exploration Company gegen Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs, zeigt diese Weltkarte das ehrgeizige politische Ziel der Firma, 
Spitzbergen in das globale britische Empire zu integrieren, wodurch der arktische Bergbau stabilisiert sowie die Bedeutung der Firma in der Region gesteigert 
würde. Quelle: Coal and iron in Spitsbergen (1918) Pam (*32); 622.333, Scott Polar Research Institute, Bibliothek, Cambridge.
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and were now taking a step back; Spitsbergen’s reputation 
had been damaged by dubious gold-diggers like the NEC; and 
the mineral resources were not thought to be lucrative during 
the Depression. After World War II, it was a lucky circum-
stance that the syndicate was eventually bought by Scottish 
Spitsbergen Development, itself short-lived and unprofitable. 
Despite the companies’ best efforts to change the legal status 
of Spitsbergen in their favour, at no point was the British 
Government officially interested in annexing the Arctic archi-
pelago. It also never subsidised the struggling British firms, 
while government subsidies kept the coal mines of Norway 
and Russia in pre-carious business until this day.
What transpires from this British example is that there were 
too few active companies to speak of a British model on 
Spitsbergen. As in the Frobisher case, the British material 
remains and archaeological landscape of exploration were 
thoroughly investigated, but on the whole, the latter remains 
poorly understood and deserving of greater attention. All four 
companies were founded for primary economic reasons at a 
time of buoyant European markets. The two pre-war mining 
companies had only minor political motives, while the two 
post-war exploration companies used the changed (geo)poli-
tical context as a promotional tool. Neither were successful. It 
remains unknown which pivotal objections prevented subsi-
diary mining companies to come forward.
The value of this in-depth British micro-level case study 
will be revealed when its parent project draws to conclu-
sion. The Large-scale Historical Exploitation of Polar Areas 
(LASHIPA) project investigates the histories of different 
exploitative industries at both poles over the last four centuries 
(HacqueBord 2012). A synthesis with the other dimensions of 
this thoroughly international endeavour will help to overcome 
the relatively narrow and unrepresentative focus with which 
polar resource frontier regions like Spitsbergen have hitherto 
been regarded.
DISCUSSION
The Arctic had already been settled for thousands of years 
when Europeans arrived on the scene around 500 years ago. 
The newcomers were primarily driven by the search for new 
sea routes and colonial ambitions. Their expeditions broad-
ened their intellectual horizons, and they built up a corpus of 
Arctic knowledge, which paved the way for industrial enter-
prises such as mineral exploration and mining. The general 
processes at work ranged from the early opportunistic and 
speculative voyages of enterprising individuals through to the 
involvement of trade organisations and companies through to 
the multifaceted aspirations of rising nation states not only at 
the national northern frontier but also in the Arctic no man’s 
land. The aim of this paper has been to outline these general 
processes on the basis of four case studies that span circum-
polar space and time to make room for comparison and eval-
uation.
Each case study offers a rich account of historical events that 
have bearing on the present and hold lessons for the near 
future. Frobisher’s expeditions have been called an individual 
effort, but both planning and execution depended as much on a 
network of influential supporters in his native England as they 
did on his ability to command the activities in Frobisher Bay. 
To use to the terminology of an analytical framework from 
the social sciences called the Actor-Network Theory (law & 
Hassard 1978, law & callon 1992): as a network builder, 
Frobisher positioned himself at the obligatory point of passage 
between his global network in the home country and the local 
network in Canada. For his venture to be a success, he had 
to ascertain the flow of resources between these networks. 
Much needed investments, however, dried up as soon as the 
local network failed to deliver the gold that all stakeholders 
hoped for. Without gold or any other tangible results, Frobish-
er’s actor-network crumbled. In addition, this case study 
demonstrates how historical sources are complemented by 
archaeological evidence to provide a comprehensive image of 
past events. While Arctic mining history has hitherto focused 
mainly on the European core, timely archaeological field-
work emerges as the key with which to unlock the industrial 
experiences of the periphery. The Meta Incognita Project is 
to be applauded for the move away from the single site of 
Kodlunarn Island to include the archaeological landscape of 
prospecting and mining in Frobisher Bay. Only through this 
re-evaluation did Frobisher’s long-forgotten mines come to be 
a crucial landmark in the emergence of the Arctic as a region 
of opportunity.
Like Frobisher, Julius Thomsen was a visionary, a pioneer, 
and the promoter of an original idea, but we lose sight of this 
network builder and his initial business partners when the 
Kryolithfabriken Øresund becomes the dominant actor in the 
actor-network of the long-lived Ivigtut cryolite mine. If the 
mine were to undergo in-depth historical-archaeological study, 
which has not happened to date on the basis of its develop-
ment being seemingly well-known, the Actor-Network Theory 
would be an appropriate analytical tool despite its inability 
to deal with weak and partial connections. Furthermore, the 
core-periphery model, which was used to identify Ivigtut as 
a resource frontier region, can be used to outline and explain 
its demise to a downward transitional area. Yet, former Arctic 
mines and company towns do not have to disappear if their 
function changes in time. As with Kodlunarn Island above, 
heritage specialists have recognised the geological, techno-
logical, and cultural heritage potential of Ivigtut (Ivittuut) – 
and rightly so. It is an unfortunate oversight, therefore, that 
the site does not feature among the protected cultural heritage 
sites of Greenland (nunatta Katersugaasivia 2011). The 
very recent closure of the mine must not be the reason why the 
material record of this 130-year-old human experience in the 
Arctic should be lost.
How, if at all, do micro-level studies such as Kodlunarn Island 
or Ivigtut compare to resource frontier frenzies such as the 
Nome gold rush? In its entirety, the stampede may appear 
atypical with little opportunity for comparative work. It would 
have to be broken down into its many components, giving rise 
to individuals and companies, which may yet lend themselves 
to the Actor-Network Theory and the core-periphery model. 
Although some work has already been done in that direction, 
a discussion of this exercise is outside the scope of this article. 
Importantly, Nome highlights the influence of governmental 
legislation on the national mining frontier. Although countless 
quarrels arose within Nome’s mining districts, the sovereignty 
of Alaska was not challenged from outside the US. Backed by 
federal law, investments were fairly well protected, and the 
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transformation from mining camp to civilised frontier town 
could swiftly be achieved.
In stark contrast to governed Alaska, let alone the strict laws 
of the Canadian North, the unsettled legal status of Spits-
bergen was subject of a lengthy international dispute. From the 
first commercial shipment of coal, it took near enough three 
decades before the Arctic no man’s land could be brought 
under Norwegian control and before all claim disputes were 
arbitrated. During this time, any investments on the archipe-
lago were at risk. The case study gave an impression of how 
four British companies dealt with the unstable situation. 
Ongoing research will show how other nationalities fared 
under the circumstances. Together, these micro-studies will 
give rise to the most complete historical image of an Arctic 
mining landscape to date.
At the time of writing, Ken Coates of the University of 
Saskatchewan carried out a timely assessment of the history 
and historiography of non-renewable resource development 
in the Canadian Arctic. The four case studies presented here 
support his observation of “a long and complicated history of 
resource development, albeit one marked more by hope and 
promise than by practical results.” (Coates pers. com. 2014) 
He bemoans the fact that Canadian historians have paid too 
little attention to the topic. His review of the scholarly litera-
ture reveals several key themes, only some of which could be 
touched on in this article. As such, mining history is on the 
whole an underrepresented historical and archaeological disci-
pline. It has been “pro-development and celebratory” in the 
past, paying homage to the leaders in economic development 
on regional and national level. What Coates (pers. com. 2014) 
refers to as “southern-focused scholarship”, “policy-orien-
tated work”, and “Ottawa-centred” in the Canadian context 
translates into the one-sided emphasis on core regions such 
as England, Denmark, and the US criticised in this paper. 
He therefore welcomes the contemporary move towards the 
critical evaluation of resource development that incorporates 
north-centred approaches and considers both newcomer popu-
lations and indigenous communities on equal terms.
Broadly speaking, this fresh historical direction recognises 
that “studying resource peripheries can provide new insights 
into the global economy that cannot be derived from the 
experiences of cores.” (Hayter al. 2003, 17). Such insights 
additionally lead to a better understanding of long-term 
environmental effects and changing Arctic ecosystems. In 
fact, “for resource peripheries around the globe, environ-
mental, cultural, and geopolitical factors are intersecting 
with industrial dynamics in unique ways.” (Hayter et al. 
2003, 21) Historians are particularly apt at generating histor-
ical knowledge in order to define and clarify public policy 
issues. Why then, wonders Coates (pers. com. 2014), have 
historians not come forward in the commonly controversial 
debates surrounding modern Arctic resource development, and 
why have governments and industry shown so little interest 
in the historical context? After all, “historical understanding 
is central to a society’s abilities to confront the present and 
make constructive choices about the future.” (Coates pers. 
com. 2014)
CONCLUSION
The history of European commercial exploitation of Arctic 
mineral resources after 1500 AD is long, complex – and far 
from over. Unfortunately, it is underrepresented in the study 
of Arctic resource development as a whole. The monumental 
tasks that face Arctic mining historians and industrial archae-
ologists alike are therefore two-fold: to critically evaluate 
the underlying circumpolar processes and to provide the 
much-needed historical context to modern debates on Arctic 
resource extraction. As a starting point, this paper dealt with 
four case studies. They are descriptive rather than analytical as 
they offer a broad overview of mining across Arctic space and 
time. In summary, Frobisher exposed the Arctic as a region 
of commercial opportunity some four hundred years ago; the 
evolving uses of cryolite pinpoint global demand as the main 
driver behind Arctic mining; the Nome gold rush emphasized 
the importance of legislature in the orderly settlement of the 
northern mining frontier; and nowhere else depicts the trans-
formation from polar wilderness to Arctic industry better than 
Spitsbergen. Although few in number, these case studies hint 
at numerous intricacies in the historical development of Arctic 
mineral exploitation.
As a prologue to the present and the near future, timely lessons 
to be learned from this are that the mineral resources of the 
Arctic have been over-promoted to investors from outside 
the region, who grossly underestimate the harmfulness of 
Arctic climate and northern logistics to commercial viability. 
The reality is likely to disappoint all but a lucky few. High 
grading dominates Arctic mining as the wealth produced flows 
out of the region to southern stakeholders, closely followed 
by a transient workforce who on the whole will not stay and 
develop the North. Government policy has favoured national 
economic benefits not regional returns, largely ignoring indig-
enous peoples. More recently, natives and locals alike are 
insisting on bigger and better returns, raising the question if 
labour-saving technologies can ethically be used in areas of 
high unemployment. Lastly, who will be left to contemplate 
and remediate any long-term detrimental environmental 
impacts when the culprits are long gone? The reader cannot 
but agree with Coates (pers. com. 2014) that “if the Arctic 
is to better understand the likely implications for the North 
from expanded resource development, it follows that a greater 
appreciation for historical patterns and processes could and 
should be invaluable.” Historians and archaeologists working 
at the Arctic research frontier must be relied on not only to 
create such an appreciation but to also share it widely and 
purposefully.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This scientific review article was initiated by the International 
Arctic Science Committee (IASC): Action Group in Geosci-
ences and Louwrens Hacquebord of the Arctic Centre of the 
University of Groningen with the aim of providing a much-
needed historical perspective on currently emerging questions 
in Arctic geosciences. The author is grateful for the discus-
sions of pressing matters with Karsten Secher of the Geolog-
ical Survey of Denmark and Ken Coates of the University 
of Saskatchewan. Special thanks to William Fitzhugh of the 
Arctic Studies Centre of the Smithsonian Institute and Vincent 
26
Lafond of the Canadian Museum of History for their valuable 
input as well as the use of their photographs. Additional thanks 
to the two anonymous reviewers for their kind and construc-
tive comments on the manuscript.
References
Alaska Dispatch News (2012): Nome’s new gold rush. <http://www.adn.
com/alaska-news/slideshow/photos-nomes-new-gold-rush/2012/09/18/>  
(3 October 2014).
Alsford, S. (ed) (1993): The Meta Incognita Project: contributions to field 
studies.- Hull: Canadian Museum of Civilization.
Avango, D. (2005): Sveagruvan – Svensk gruvhantering mellan industry, 
diplomati och geovetenskap.- Stockholm: Jernkantoret, 1-440.
Canadian Register (2009): In: Parks Canada, Canada’s historic places: 
Kodlunarn Island National Historic Site of Canada.
 <http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/rep-reg/place-lieu.aspx?id=11908>  
(26 September 2014)
Carlson, L.H. (1946): The discovery of gold at Nome, Alaska.- Pacific Histor-
ical Review 15 (3): 259-278.
Carlson, L.H. (1947a): The first mining season at Nome, Alaska – 1899.- 
Pacific Historical Review 16 (2): 163-175.
Carlson, L.H. (1947b): Nome: from mining camp to civilized community.- 
The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 38 (3): 233-242.
Castells, J.V. (2009): Frozen assets: science, natural philosophy, and the quest 
for arctic gold.- Unpubl. MA Thesis, University of South Florida, 1-49.
Coates, K. (1987): Controlling the periphery: the territorial administration of 
the Yukon and Alaska, 1867-1959.- The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 78 
(4): 145-151.
Commander Resources Ltd. (2006): Baffin Island Au, Nunavut. <http://www.
commanderresources.com/s/BaffinIsland.asp> (26 September 2014).
Dartford Town Archive (2014): Sir Martin Frobisher’s smelting works in 
Dartford. <http://www.dartfordarchive.org.uk/early_modern/industry_
sm.shtml> (2 October 2014).
DePasqual, S. (2009): Winning coal at 78° north: mining, contingency and the 
Chaîne Opératoire in Old Longyear City.- Unpubl MSc Thesis. Michigan 
Technological University, 1-184.
Donald, M.B. (1950): Burchard Kranich (c. 1515-1578), miner and queen’s 
physician, Cornish mining stamps, antimony, and Frobisher’s gold.- 
Annals of Science 6 (3): 308-322.
Edwards, K.J., Cook, G.T., Nyegaard, G. & Schofield, J.E. (2013): Towards 
a first chronology for the middle settlement of Norse Greenland: 14C and 
related studies of animal bone and environmental material.- Radiocarbon 
55 (1): 1-17.
Ehrenstein, R.M. (1998): Mining, colonialism and the culture contact. Euro-
pean miners and the indigenous population in the sixteenth-century 
Arctic.- In: Social approaches to an industrial past: the archaeology and 
anthropology of mining. London: Routledge, 109-120.
Elbo, J.G. (1948): Cryolite and the mine at Ivigtut, West Greenland.- Polar 
Record 5 (35-6): 185-188.
EuroGeoSurveys (2014): Sustaining and promoting the mining heritage of 
Europe,
 <http://www.euromines.org/sites/default/files/10_Nikolaos_Arvantidis_
web.pdf> (3 October 2014).
Fitzhugh, W.W. & Olin, J.S. (1993): Archaeology of the Frobisher voyages.- 
Washington: Smithsonian Institute, 1-271.
Friedmann, J. (1966): Regional development policy: a case study of Vene-
zuela.- Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1-279.
Government of Greenland (2014): Mining history, <http://www.govmin.gl/
minerals/mining-history> (26 Sepember. 2014).
Hacquebord, L. (ed) (2012): LASHIPA. History of large scale exploitation in 
polar areas.- Groningen. Barkhuis, 1-172.
Hamilton, G.G. (1978): The structural sources of adventurism: the case of the 
California gold rush.- Amer. J. Sociology 83 (6): 1466-1490.
Hartnell, C.C. (2009): Arctic network builders: the Arctic Coal Company’s 
operations on Spitsbergen and its relationship with the environment.- 
Unpubl. PhD Thesis. Michigan Technological University, 1-322.
Hayter, R., Barnes, T.J. & Bradshaw, M.J. (2003): Relocating resource periph-
eries to the core of economic geography’s theorizing: rationale and 
agenda.- Area 35 (1): 15-23.
Hoel, A. (1966a): Svalbard: Svalbards historie 1596-1965, Part 1.- Oslo: 
Sverre Kildahls Boktrykkeri.
Hoel, A. (1966b): Svalbard: Svalbards historie 1596-1965, Part 2.- Oslo: 
Sverre Kildahls Boktrykkeri.
Hoel, A. (1967): Svalbard: Svalbards historie 1596-1965, Part 3.- Oslo: Sverre 
Kildahls Boktrykkeri.
Hogarth, D.D. & Loop, J. (1986): Precious metals in Martin Frobisher’s 
“black ores” from Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories.- Canadian 
Mineralogist 24: 259-263.
Hogarth, D.D., Boreham, P.W. & Mitchell, J.G. (1994): Martin Frobisher’s 
northwest venture, 1576-1581: mines, minerals and metallurgy.- Hull. 
Canadian Museum of History. 
Holland, C. (1994): Arctic Exploration and Development.- New York. 
Garland Publishing, 1-704.
IMM (2014): Ivittuut Mine- og Mineralmuseum. <www.imm.gl> 3 October 
2014.
Kostov, R.I. (2010): Gem minerals and materials from the Neolithic and 
Chalcolithic periods in Bulgaria and their impact on the history of 
gemmology.- Scientific Annals, School of Geology, Aristotle Univ. Thes-
saloniki Proc. of the XIX CBGA Congress, Thessaloniki, Greece, Special.
Kragh, H. (1995): From curiosity to industry: the early history of cryolite soda 
manufacture.- Annals of Science 52 (3): 285-301.
Kruse, F. (2013): Frozen assets. British mining, exploration, and geopolitics 
on Spitsbergen, 1904-53.- Eelde. Barkhuis, 1-463.
Law, J. & Hassard, J. (eds) (1987): Actor network theory and after.- Oxford & 
Keele. Blackwell & Sociological Review, 1-256.
Law, J. & Callon, M. (1992): The life and death of an aircraft: a network anal-
ysis of technical change.- In: W.E. BIJKER & J. LAW (eds): Shaping 
technology/building society, studies in sociotechnical change.- London. 
MIT Press: 21-52.
McDermott, J. (2004a): Frobisher, Sir Martin (1535?-1594)’, Oxford Dictio-
nary of National Biography.-
  <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10191?docPos=1> (2 October 
2014).
McDermott, J. (2004b): Lok, Michael (c.1532-1620x22)’, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography.-
 <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16950?docPos=2> (2 October 
2014).
McKee, L. (1902): The land of Nome.- New York. Grafton Press, 1-276.
Nunatta Katersugaasivia (2011): Cultural heritage Greenland – Ruins and 
buildings. <http://www.kulturi.org/en/index.html> (3 October 2014).
Pavel, P., Svendsen, J.I. & Indrelid, S. (2001): Human presence in the Euro-
pean Arctic nearly 40,000 years ago.- Nature 413: 64-67.
Pitulko, V.V., Nikolsky, P.A., Girya, E. Yu., Basilyan, A.E., Tumskoy, V.E., 
Koulakov, S.A., Astakhov, S.N., Pavlova, E.Yu. & Anisimov, M.A. 
(2004): The Yana RHS site: humans in the Arctic before the last glacial 
maximum.- Science 303 (5654): 52-56.
Ralph, J. & Chau, I. (2014a): Cryolite. <http://www.mindat.org/min-1161.
html> (21 November 2014).
Ralph, J. & Chau, I. (2014b): Ivigtut cryolite deposit.
 <http://www.mindat.org/loc-1958.html> (21 November 2014).
Rasmussen (2005): Ivittuut.- In: M. NUTTALL (ed) (2005): Encyclopedia of 
the Arctic.- New York. Routledge:1030-1031.
Secher, K. (2002): Early mining activities in South Greenland, Greenland 
Mineral Resources Fact Sheet No. 2.
 <http://www.geus.dk/DK/publications/newsletters/minex/Sider/fact_
sheets-dk.aspx> (29 September 2014).
Secher, K. (2003): Map of known mineral occurrences in Greenland.- 
Greenland Mineral Resources Fact Sheet No. 5. <http://www.geus.
dk/DK/publications/newsletters/minex/Sider/fact_sheets-dk.aspx> 
(29. September 2014).




Strøm Tejsen, A.V. (1977): The history of the Royal Greenland Trade Depart-
ment.- Polar Record 18 (116): 451-474.
Sugden, D. (1982): Arctic and Antarctic: a modern geographical synthesis.- 
Oxfor. Blackwell, 1-472.
Symons, T.H.B. (1999a): The Meta Incognita Project, 1990 – 1999.
 <http://www.historymuseum.ca/cmc/exhibitions/hist/frobisher/frsub16e.
shtml> (11 November 2014).
Symons, T.H.B. (1999b): Meta Incognita: a discourse in discovery. Martin 
Frobisher’s Arctic expeditions, 1576-1578 (2 vols.).- Hull. Canadian 
Museum of History, 1-636.
